© Gleb Garanich / ReutersProtester vendt mod regeringen på Majdan Nezalezjnosti i Kiev, 30 januar, 2014.
Jeg har tænkt over, hvor længe det ville tage. Men nu, da det er sket, lad os løfte juleglasset til New York Times og dets jouirnalist, Andrew Kramer. Fordi de har endeligt indrømmet at de af os som var imod Kiev's "Euromaidan" bevægelse havde ret. Desuden, har USA kendte avis anerkendt at Yanukovich, på trods af bladets egen brændende støtte til det voldelige kup, gjorde ret i ikke at underskrive den hårde frihandelsaftale med den Europæiske Union.
The NYT bruger kollapset af Ukraines engang lukrative landbrugsindustri til at illustrere landets tilbagegang. Specielt fjerkræbranchen, som på grund af dårlige EU kvoter og tabet af det russiske marked er blevet decimeret.
"Sektoren udgør omkring 40 % af Ukraines eksporter. Men de toldfrie kvoter for de fleste af de landbrugsprodukter, der omfattes af aftalen, er meget små," skriver Kramer.
"Kvoterne for honning var for eksempel så lave, at de blev opfyldt i løbet af årets første seks uger. Kvotaerne for æg til den Europæiske Union beløb sig til omkring 1,5 % af blot et enkelt firma, Avangards, årlige produktion, for slet ikke at tale om hele sektoren."
Avisen indrømmer at "aftalen gav et dobbelt slag til landbrugssektoren: Den gik langt nok til at gøre Rusland vred, men gik ikke langt nok til med øjeblikkelig virkning at åbne op for et nyt lukrativt marked."
Kommentar: Delvist oversat af Sott.net fra 3 years later New York Times admits Ukraine's Yanukovich was right not to sign EU deal
Waking up
Accepting that the EU arrangement is bad business also kiboshes the long-held NYT narrative where Yanukovich served as Moscow's "pro-Russian" placeholder. The fact he negotiated with Brussels until the very last moment before rejecting their association agreement, has always countered this lazy supposition anyway. Yet, the simple black and white truth is that Russia offered better terms. A $15 billion loan and gas discounts, plus continued access to an economy which Kiev was already heavily integrated with.
However, back in late 2013, if you warned how the EU pact wasn't a clever idea for Ukraine, you were called a "useful idiot" or a "Russian stooge." This was despite the fact that such a position was the only logical analysis of the situation. There has never been a country in world history which wrecked relations with its main, nation-state, trading partner and immediately prospered from it.
Also, the EU accord wasn't quite what it was cracked up to be. Despite all its idealistic talk, Brussels insisted upon stingy quotas on Kiev's exports and offered no guarantee Ukrainians would promptly receive even visa-free travel from Schengen states. Indeed, more than three years on, and having bent over backward for Eurocrats, they still can't freely enter the bloc.
As I wrote at the time: "According to statistics the benefits of acceding to the Free Trade regime amount to €490 million per annum. However, if President Putin decided to pull the plug on Ukrainian access to his market (which, ironically, Poroshenko partially later did in a sort of petulant suicide), the loss of the Russian and Belarusian outlets would amount to €16 billion annually." Hence, the idea that Yanukovich worked in concert with the Kremlin was always preposterous. On the contrary, many Russian officials disliked him because they felt he played them off against Brussels for too long.
False promise
Of course, it was a fallacy to suggest how Ukraine's standards of living and economic well-being could swiftly improve through ties with the EU. On the contrary, honest analysts could clearly see that even if it had been suddenly offered rapid full membership, Ukraine would go into a tailspin. Because its industry and workforce aren't competitive and haven't kept up technologically during the last 20 to 30 years. Not to mention how its education system is a shambles, where professorships are usually purchased, and it's almost impossible to graduate without greasing a palm or a dozen. Thus, it's impossible to be sure if younger Ukrainians are qualified to the extent their parchments imply.
Kramer's piece highlights the economic emergency in Ukraine right now. He quotes Oleg Bakhmatyuk, owner of the aforementioned 'Avangard:' "We need capital investment and trade investment," he said.
"There's no liquidity. We are losing our export market. As an agricultural territory, we are moving backward."
And it's not just agriculture. Heavy industry has been choked by obstructions on cooperation with its natural Russian partners. For instance, Antonov, the iconic airplane manufacturer, found itself declared bankrupt earlier this year. This was especially sad considering Ukraine had been an aviation superpower in its own right, punching way above its size
Meanwhile, Kramer also cites some positives from the EU relationship. Such as how the western edge (around fanatically pro-Brussels Lvov) has benefited from some investment and "niches like a ski manufacturing industry have done well." That said, no country has ever been built on making skiing gear. And to even attempt such a thing would be the start of a slippery slope.
By finally admitting the reality on the ground in Ukraine, the NYT might have begun a process which will see it start to report the truth from there. Also, the impending arrival of Donald Trump as president has probably focused some minds.
Being right about Maidan, and the dangers it presented, didn't make those of us who called it correctly "useful idiots." Accurately representing the situation in Petro Poroshenko's Ukraine won't transform the New York Times' editors into "Kremlin stooges" either.
Kommentar: See also: Moscow court recognizes ousting of Ukraine president in 2014 as coup d'état